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The Congress Party as the Creator, 
Preserver and Destroyer of the 
Indian State? 
Jona Aravind Dohrmann 
Sons of Ind, why sit ye idle, 
Wait ye for some Deva’s aid? 
Buckle to, be up and doing! 
Nations by themselves are made! 
(Sir Allan Octavian Hume, “Awake”)1 
 
1 Introduction 
The introductory titular deliberation whether the Congress Party or Indian National 
Congress (INC) could be revered to as the Creator, Preserver and (potential) De-
stroyer of the Indian State shall hint at a possible viewpoint from which this party 
can be examined. Readers familiar with Indian religions and mythology may imme-
diately identify the aforementioned characterisation of the INC as an allegory of the 
famous Trimurti.2 Before delving into the role of the INC through the past decades it 
is worthwhile to highlight Sir Allan Octavian Hume, who is the author of the „awak-
ening“ and rousing poem framing this article. His feats mark a seizable starting point 
from which the Congress Party set out in its quest to become India’s most dazzling 
political party. Well aware of the fact that there is no dearth of writings on India’s 
eldest party this article shall simply attempt to shed light on the Indian National 
Congress’ impact on forming the Indian State. Thereby the term ‘State’ shall be 
understood the way the Indian Constitution designs the Indian Republic which is a 
                                                          
1  First stanza from poem by Sir A.O. Hume, taken from “The Old Man’s Hope” (Calcutta, 
1886), cited in: Mehrotra 2005, p. 75. 
2  The Trimurti or triad represents all aspects of the Supreme Being. The Trimurti is de-
picted as a single-bodied, three-headed man. In the famous Elephanta Caves near Mumbai 
the Trimurti statue depicts the three aspects of Shiva as creator, preserver and destroyer. 
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union of its various states. Through the Constitution the Constituent Assembly 
wanted to establish India as a democracy with a strong centre as well as with a 
strong secular bias. In this concept the people within India were recognised as one 
Nation, thereby juxtaposing the Indian against the Pakistani concept of Hindus and 
Muslims being two different Nations. Therefore, for our purposes, any of the INC’s 
impact on the structure of the Indian Union, secular set-up and/or democracy is seen 
as an action relevant for the situation of the Indian State. 
Almost everything about the Indian National Congress is remarkable. One of the 
most striking features of the party in question is that it was founded by a member of 
the British Indian Civil Service – a Scotsman. This is probably the only instance in 
modern history in which a nationalist party in a colonial territory was organised and 
led for many years by a member of the ruling authority, which was the British Em-
pire. But in a country where members of a Legislative Assembly (MLA) are flown 
out of the state by their own party men into another state belonging to the same party 
to avoid their being wooed to another party,3 exceptional things can be expected. 
Now it seems the Indian National Congress has come full circle with an Italian-born 
person at the helm of party affairs. It is rather unusual for a party which claims to 
have been the main propellant in the struggle for independence to have been under 
the direct influence of foreigners or foreign born people, even having been estab-
lished by one. In the following I would like to emphasise on a few aspects of the 
Indian National Congress which for a long time was seen as the state-supported and 
state-supporting party of India (Rothermund). This article looks at the Indian Na-
tional Congress under the hypothesis that it can be seen as the Creator, the Preserver 
and also the potential Destroyer of the Indian State. The corroboration of the hy-
pothesis is not as important as the widening of the reader’s angle. 
 
2 Founding of the Indian National Congress 
As already drawn attention to, the Indian National Congress is the brainchild of a 
Civil Servant of the British Empire. Allan Octavian Hume was born in 1829. Al-
ready his father, Joseph Hume, had served in India and was the founder of the Radi-
cal Party in England. At the young age of 20 Allan Octavian Hume set foot on In-
dian soil in Calcutta (as it was till recently known, though today called Kolkata) as 
member of the Bengal Civil Service. As a politically alert person he must have 
absorbed every development in pre-Victorian governed India which eventually led 
to the administrative take-over of the reigns of India by the British Crown. Preced-
ing the take-over was the Indian Mutiny of 1857 which made a strong impression on 
Hume. On one hand, he escaped death narrowly at the hands of rebels; on the other 
                                                          
3  Indian newspapers in the month of February have repeatedly reported that about a dozen 
of BJP MLAs from Goa have been taken to Rajasthan after the party leadership feared 
poaching by the INC ahead of a vote of confidence in the Goa Assembly, vide: “BJP 
herds its Goa MLAs to Lake City”, Sunday Times of 20.02.2005, page 1. 
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hand, he had always disdained any kind of tumultuous upheaval. Throughout his 
later life Hume was haunted by the fragile construct of Imperial rule in South Asia. 
As Mehrotra put it, Hume feared yet another and more terrible revolt in India, so 
much so that he bent all his energy to safeguard against there being a repetition of 
the 1857 happenings and to ensure that Indians gained self-government without 
violence and bloodshed (Mehrotra 2005: 59). Mehrotra goes on to narrate that 
Hume, far from being embittered by India or Indians, regarded India not as his exile 
home but genuinely loved the country and its people with whom he easily made 
friends. After being a collector and commissioner of customs he was appointed in 
late 1870 by the then viceroy, Lord Mayo, as officiating Home Secretary in the im-
perial government of India. Later he was secretary in the Department of Revenue, 
Agriculture and Commerce. Though being an able administrator he was seen by his 
fellow colleagues as eccentric and egoistical which later led to his downfall after his 
interceder, Lord Mayo, was succeeded by less lenient viceroys. On Viceroy 
Northbrook’s arrival to India in 1872 Hume told him frankly in writing that the 
British were not loved in India and in no unclear words criticised the British Indian 
Government: 
A studied and invariable disregard, if not actually contempt for the opinions and 
feelings of our subjects, is at the present day the leading characteristic of our 
government in every branch of the administration.4 
After his suspension Hume was demoted to the post of a member of the board of 
revenue in Allahabad. Little did the Viceroyalty suspect that this was a blessing in 
disguise for the rise of the party that was to determine or co-determine India’s fate 
for more than the next 100 years. His official career ruined when he was just 50, his 
demotion set him free to devote his time and energy to the cause of Indian national-
ism. Coinciding was the emergence of theosophical thoughts in India. Therein Hume 
was most attracted by its principal tenet regarding the essential unity of all religions 
and the universal brotherhood of man (Mehrotra 2005: 63). His fortunes turned 
again when Lord Ripon, a rather indophil and socialist viceroy, took charge of India. 
The following was what he confided to a radical friend in early 1883: 
[M]y view of the work which I am engaged in is that I am laying the foundation upon 
which hereafter be built a more complete system of self-government for India which 
may convert what is now a successful administration by foreigners into a real 
government of the country by itself. If in one or two generations, nay, even if in 
another century, we can accomplish the undertaking, and can render India self-
governing upon just and equal principles, our work here will have been done.5 
Hume, who had by then left his political isolation, served as an intermediary be-
tween the viceroy and the Indians to ascertain and organise Indian opinion in favour 
                                                          
4  Hume to Northbrook, 1 August 1872, Northbrook Papers, cited in: Mehrotra 2005. 
5  Ripon to Thomas Hughes, 9 January 1883, Ripon Papers, cited in: Mehrotra 2005. 
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of Ripon’s liberal policies, which would allow Indians a larger share in local self-
government. Ripon left India in December 1884. No other viceroy before or after 
Ripon was more dear to the natives as he was, and conversely no other viceroy was 
possibly so detestable to the Anglo-Indian community as Ripon. Long before M.K. 
Gandhi was called ‘Mahatma’, this honour went to Lord Ripon, who was also called 
by educated Indians ‘Ripon the Righteous’. When he finally left India at the end of 
1884 he was given a farewell which not even Lord Mountbatten was to receive (Me-
hrotra 2005: 66). 
Until and during Ripon’s tenure as viceroy the well-to-do segment of Indian 
society had developed considerably regarding (British-fashioned) education, mass 
transport and communication, increased urbanisation, augmenting (though limited) 
participation in local government and the creation of new professional classes. All 
this incited the growing will amongst educated Indians to strive for some sort of 
political participation in the formation of government opinion and policy. Ironically, 
attempts to bring about a common arena of political will formation failed, mainly for 
want of the right leadership. In this historical moment Hume provided the perfect 
leadership. Neither was he the first person in India to conceive of the idea of a pan-
Indian political organisation nor was he a leader with any sizable Indian backing, but 
he had time to spend, accompanied with energy, contacts with and the support of 
Indian leaders as well as organisational skills. Thus he probably became the first 
person in modern colonial India to embark on a yatra or (political) pilgrimage long 
before the Gandhis and Advanis of more recent times used this means of political 
agitation. His enterprise was to ‘link in’: 
I propose to make a little private tour – […] – I propose to come to Poona […] Then 
go on to Madras, Calcutta, Patna (perhaps Dacca), Benares, Allahabad, Agra, Delhi, 
Amritsar and Lahore – possibly also Lucknow and some other places. I want to make 
a practical effort towards that linking in which has now become a matter of vital 
importance to us.6 
With the tacit support of the new Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, Hume invited those visited 
on his all-India journey to the first Indian National Congress in Bombay, held on 28 
to 30 December 1885. The meeting was presided over by W.C. Bonnerjee from 
Calcutta. Interestingly most of the around 70 delegates did not know each other per-
sonally prior to the assembly. But Hume did. Contrary to his description of being 
egoistical, Hume never assumed the highest office within the Indian National Con-
gress. Nevertheless, he dominated the INC for several years as a general secretary 
looking after the correspondence, the publicity, the organisation and the finances of 
the party. This occupation continued until 1901 when the first Indian, G.K. Gokhale, 
became a full-time worker of the Indian National Congress. 
                                                          
6  Hume to S.H. Chiplonkar, 16 November 1884, Chiplonkar Papers, cited in: Mehrotra 
2005. Chiplonkar was then the secretary of the Pune-based Sarvajanik Sabha, which then 
was the leading political association in India. 
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Eventually the grand old party of the Indian subcontinent emerged from the dif-
fuse political landscape of British-India into the limelight of political discourse. 
Hume experienced a mixed fate. In his role as an advocate for the Indian cause he 
was perhaps bound to come into conflict with the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, who very 
soon sensed that Hume was not simply meddling with the Indian National Congress 
to create a safety-valve to avert hostile challenge to the British Raj but was helping 
the INC to become a national party which intended to weld India into a state and to 
secure for it home rule or dominion status in about half a century (Mehrotra 2005: 
71). 
To pick up the thread from the beginning, viewing the INC as the progenitor of 
the Indian State, it will be interesting to keep in mind that the initiating impulse to 
liberate India with non-violent means through an ever growing political process was 
given by a member of the very country whose yoke would eventually be shaken off. 
 
3 Creating India 
Soon the INC was firmly established as a political organisation, which in the begin-
ning only encompassed rather conservative dignitaries from the Indian society with a 
sprinkle of progressive British men, who from time to time even presided over the 
annual Congress meetings until as late as 1917. (Sonia Gandhi interestingly contin-
ued this tradition of foreign leaders in 1998 in being heaved to the party president’s 
post.) Whereas after the inception of the INC its members were keen on extracting 
marginal (compared to the demand of home rule) concessions from the imperial 
government of India so as not to disturb the relationship with the viceroys, these 
moderates gradually came into conflict with more radical-minded members of the 
INC, which led to the party’s first, but temporary split in 1907, later patched up in 
1916 – the year after Mahatma Gandhi returned to India from his venture in South 
Africa. Although Mehra describes this schism period as fruitful for the crystallisa-
tion of a party system in India7 – and there is no reason to doubt this – the schism 
also weakened the impetus of the party for some time and gave the English more 
breathing room. The old guard of the INC, which still had faith in this strategy of 
petitions and appeals towards the British rule, gradually became overwhelmed by 
the new brand of leaders, which supported more aggressive strategies for emphasis-
ing their demands. Unpopular measures such as those of the then Viceroy, Lord 
Curzon, of dividing Bengal, further eroded the political stand of the moderates. 
In the pre-independence period Mehra assigns three distinct stages to the INC’s 
development (Mehra/Khanna/Kueck 2003: 63-64), which helps simplify this event-
ful period of Indian history. During the first stage, from 1885 to 1905, it remained an 
elitist debating society, petitioning the government for extra privileges for the few, 
which has been described as the ‘politics of mendicancy’ (Brass/Robinson 1987: 3). 
                                                          
7  Ajay K. Mehra, “Historical Development of the Party Systems in India”, in: Me-
hra/Khanna/Kueck 2003, p. 63. 
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The second stage (1905-1916) comprises the aforementioned crucial time of schism, 
in which the great debate between the moderates and the extremists over strategy led 
to an initial loss of the latter, but foreshadowed the later change that would pave the 
way for Mahatma Gandhi. The third and last pre-independence stage from 1916 to 
1946 saw the INC taking shape as a mass movement. This period came to an end 
with the formation of an interim government. This was the time, too, when India 
was formed as a nation-state. After a certain stage of development it became obvious 
that British-India as a whole would cease to exist due to unbridgeable differences 
between especially the INC under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and others and 
the Muslim League under Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Here the paper does not delve too 
deeply into the intricacies of the separation or the whys of splitting as these subjects 
are still highly controversial and a subject of a host of publications. 
In these formative years Mahatma Gandhi had already crossed the peak of his in-
fluence on daily politics, which were more and more becoming diplomatic back-
room discussions between the concerned parties to it. By 1942, at the summit of the 
‘Quit India’ movement, control passed on to the young socialists. Many a Congress-
man deplored the fact that Mahatma Gandhi was not listened to in this crucial period 
of power transition.8 The INC high command around Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel 
became weary of the decades of fighting the British Raj and of spending weeks, 
months and years in prisons. They wanted to harvest the fruits of their long toiling 
for India’s independence. Furthermore they had tasted their share of power under the 
Government of India Act, 1935, and were now eager to use their skills in Free India. 
Contrary to a much aired belief within India, Mahatma Gandhi was probably the 
only fairly influential authority to oppose the ‘vivisection’ of British-India when it 
came to decision-making in the viceregal chambers. This should not imply that the 
INC as a whole was not committed to a united India – this was what they had been 
fighting for for the previous decades – but the élan and possibly the resilience to 
counter the strong claim for a separate state of Pakistan had evaded the Congress 
leadership. 
Nevertheless, preceding the actual split there were several last-minute attempts 
to save British-India’s unity. The conservative British government under Sir 
Winston Churchill attempted one last time to solve the constitutional deadlock in 
India in June 1945 during the Shimla conference. According to the Wavell Plan the 
                                                          
8  Jha 2004, pp. 97-107. According to Jha, who had grown up in one of the ashrams near 
Calcutta which served as Gandhi’s headquarters during his visits to Assam and Bengal, 
the Congress leadership together with the British Government along with Jinnah was 
guilty of allowing India to be partitioned. Jha especially reproaches Nehru and Patel for 
letting Jinnah have his way. About Gandhi, he quotes Gandhi’s secretary, Pyarelal, that he 
was not ready to contain Nehru and Patel as they knew his point of view. Gandhi could 
not resort to non-cooperation with his colleagues because their judgement differed from 
his own and was not willing to ‘threaten his colleagues with sabotage […] because they 
felt unable to go his way.’ (p. 105). 
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Executive Council should have been provided with an equal number of seats for 
Hindus and Muslims, though Hindus even before partition constituted approximately 
70 per cent of British-India’s population. In order to achieve independence at the 
earliest possible, the INC agreed to this modus operandi. But the leader of the Mus-
lim League, Jinnah, opposed this suggestion and contested the INC’s claim to repre-
sent all Indians – i.e., also the Muslims – as he suspected the INC of trying to dis-
unite the Muslim League. The INC even wanted to nominate Muslim candidates for 
their quota in the Executive Council, which must have been a clear affront against 
Jinnah. Thus the INC once again demonstrated towards the British and also towards 
the Muslim League that it did not at all subscribe to the ‘Two-Nation-Theory’ prom-
ulgated by Jinnah and the Muslim League. According to the theory’s contention 
Muslims and Hindus form two separate nations who need to be accommodated in 
different states. In the end the Shimla Conference ended without any result. Any-
way, this conference was ill-fated in its inception as parliamentary elections were 
about to be held in England in which the conservative government wanted to score 
on successes in foreign affairs, namely the Indian question (Dohrmann 2002: 25). 
The electoral victory of the Labour Party, which bestowed them an absolute ma-
jority, constituted a turning point in this deadlock. In March 1946 England’s new 
Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, recognised the right of self-determination for Indi-
ans. But the Labour government missed the opportunity to set the pace pro-actively 
from a commanding position (Rothermund 1993: 17). They failed to outline con-
crete steps towards India’s independence in any government policy statement and 
thus stumbled into the vortex of rivalry infighting between the INC and the Muslim 
League. After elections had also taken place in the Indian provinces the Labour gov-
ernment assigned the so called Cabinet Mission– consisting of cabinet ministers – 
with solving the conflicts within India. In a three partite conference (INC, Muslim 
League, British Government) again in the hill station of Shimla the Cabinet Mission 
moved a plan (Cabinet Mission Plan), according to which a federal state with a weak 
central government was suggested. Every province was called upon to depute its 
representatives into a Constituent Assembly. In these provinces the electorate was to 
be divided into ‘general’, Muslim and Sikh voters. Geographically three sections 
were drawn up, which constituted more or less today’s Pakistan including Punjab, 
today’s India without the eastern provinces and today’s Bangladesh. A sovereign 
Pakistan was rejected by the Cabinet Mission. They tried to demolish Jinnah’s idea 
of partition by threatening him with the offer of a Pakistan minus those districts of 
Punjab, Assam and Bengal with a pre-dominantly Muslim population. The Cabinet 
Mission, therefore, in spite of strong objections from the INC and the Muslim 
League, went ahead to recommend certain complicated and purposely vague propos-
als of their own. These tempted the League to secure a bigger Pakistan, provided 
they were willing to work for some time the constitution of an ‘Indian Union’. At 
the same time it enticed the INC of preserving at least a semblance of Indian unity, 
provided it was willing to run the risk of India being divided not only into two but 
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three or more parts in future, should the dissenting Provinces opt out of the Union 
(Mehrotra 2005: 278).  
In June 1946 the quarrelling parties rather reluctantly agreed at first to accept the 
plan. No agreements were achieved concerning the crucial question in how far a 
region could opt out of a once allotted section or change to another section or 
whether it at all had to be part of any section (Chandra 1998: 492). Not unnaturally, 
both the INC and the Muslim League interpreted the plan as favourable to them. 
Jinnah never within himself compromised the idea of having a sovereign Pakistan. 
In the provincial election which had taken place prior to the arrival of the Cabinet 
Mission the INC had won a clear majority (91.3 per cent) in the non-Muslim con-
stituencies. But also the Muslim League performed well in the separate electorates 
where it won 86.6 per cent. This boosted Jinnah’s position who in earlier elections 
had to accept severe drawbacks. This should have been an eye-opener to the INC, 
revealing that by now Jinnah had managed to get hold of the Muslim vote and that 
he would probably not let this development in his favour go without drawing benefit 
from it. Presumably in a mood of exuberant enthusiasm after the electoral victory, 
Jawaharlal Nehru in July 1946 made a politically imprudent and even disastrous 
remark in front of the All India Congress Committee (AICC). He said that the pro-
posed Constituent Assembly would be sovereign and not bound to recommendations 
of the Cabinet Mission, especially relating to geographical delineations of the Indian 
map or its sections (Chandra 1998: 493; Rothermund 1993: 19). The Muslim League 
immediately sensed the danger of being run over by a Congress majority. The 
Constituent Assembly and an interim government – as proposed by the Cabinet 
Mission – were implemented. The League at first stayed away from both and Jinnah 
rescinded his approval of the Cabinet Mission Plan and furthermore did not try his 
luck in the establishment of a Constituent Assembly but rather resorted to violence. 
The Muslim League which felt its back against the wall developed plans for what 
was to be known as the ‘Direct Action Day’ (16 August 1946), on which communal 
clashes would be provoked. The following atrocities committed by Muslim groups 
were retaliated by Hindu mobs in no way less brutally. Calcutta underwent riots 
leading to blood baths in which more than 5,000 people on both sides fell victim. 
Later, realising the risks of continued abstinence, the League entered the Interim 
Government and tried to paralyse it. Effective work was not possible. The Constitu-
ent Assembly which was eventually summoned on 9th December 1946 was consti-
tuted by representatives from the Provincial Legislatures. The Muslim League’s 
boycott lasted till the separation of India. Meanwhile, in the prevailing atmosphere 
of uncertainty, pressure from the Muslim League and communal passions bursting 
out into spasmodic rioting, the British Administration was forced to accept a sepa-
rate Pakistan and eventually conceded independence to two sovereign states (Dohr-
mann 2002: 26). 
On 20th February 1947 the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, had an-
nounced His Majesty’s ‘definite intention to take the necessary steps to effect the 
transfer of power into responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948’ 
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and clearly hinted at the possibility of partition. Attlee’s announcement was wel-
comed by the Congress Working Committee in a resolution on 8th March 1947, thus 
implicitly recognising and acquiescing to the necessity of partition. In April 1947 
Nehru publicly stated that ‘the Muslim League can have Pakistan if they want but on 
the condition that they do not take away other parts of India which do not wish to 
join Pakistan’ (Mehrotra 2005: 279), thus practically sealing India’s fate as a sepa-
rate entity from Pakistan. As mentioned before, in choosing partition of India, Con-
gress leaders chose the lesser evil (Mehrotra 2005: 281). With hindsight, the Con-
gress leaders would probably have delayed the partition process. Unbeknownst to 
them was the fact that Jinnah due to health reasons had only a short life-span left to 
enjoy the independence of Pakistan which he had wrested out of the Congress 
leaders’ hands. But in 1947, though partition was an undesirable solution, the alter-
natives which were lurking were worse: continued slavery, civil war, chaos, and the 
danger of disintegrating India into several states. On the other hand, to many Con-
gress leaders partition was not altogether an evil, as India was at long last free. No 
more imprisonments, or arduous campaigning to garner support for independence, or 
infighting with the Muslim League and no more colonial task master at whose mercy 
the people of India had been for the longest time. The INC managed to maintain the 
unity of two-thirds of India and they had not compromised their ideals of secularism, 
democracy and a common Indian nationality. Nehru was then able to implant into 
India a strong parliamentary democracy further accentuating one of the State’s 
strongest bases. In choosing the rather political and state-forming post of a Prime 
Minister Nehru paved the way for a Westminstarian democracy. Jinnah preferred – 
probably due to his illness – the more representative and apolitical post of Governor 
of Pakistan. Nehru was able to imprint his strongly democratic, secular and plural-
istic views into the fabric of Indian politics. Jinnah, who basically also was a man of 
secular views and had even advised the Indian Muslims to become faithful citizens 
of India, had no time left to develop Pakistan as a democratic state. The only conso-
lation for partition may have been that the freedom fighters could think that the 
lodestars of their fight for independence would in fact find more resonance in a more 
homogenous India than they would have found in a country where particular strong 
minority interests would have had to be accommodated. In a rather naïve vein some 
Congress leaders, like Maulana Azad, thought partition to be transitory: 
The division is only on the map of the country and not in the hearts of the people, and 
I am sure it is going to be a short-lived partition (Mehrotra 2005: 281). 
Seeing the present development in Indo-Pakistani peace talks and more so in the 
‘cricket diplomacy’ with the spectators hailing each other’s teams, one could well 
agree with Azad that the division of the once united people may only be political. 
But the latter part of his statement was probably already at the time of utterance a 
wishful thinking. 
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4 Preserving India 
Writing about ‘creating, preserving’ and later on ‘destroying’ India is not necessarily 
intended to be understood literally. Literal meaning may be more strongly attributed 
to the Creation of India as a nation-state with a set of people in certain boundaries 
with a common citizenship adhering to common rules set forth in the Indian Consti-
tution. It need not be mentioned that the INC not only helped in creating the Indian 
State but also the idea of India. This encompassed the ambitious project of accom-
modating a multitudinous people within one State. Multitudinous in the sense of 
ethnicity, language, culture, regional discrepancy and religion. There are probably 
not many modern states that have succeeded in preserving a relatively fragile, inho-
mogeneous body politic. Former states like Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Ethio-
pia (including the seceding Eritrea) were not able to maintain unity and disintegrated 
more or less violently, even without being not nearly as diverse as India was in the 
past or is even today. Positive examples, positive in the sense of preserving a rather 
peaceful union, are Canada and China. In between, but hardly comparable, is Iraq, 
which appears to be held together by an American bracket. 
It is not unusual that attaining a goal is easier than preserving it. India, under the 
leadership of the INC, had achieved independence. But was India fit for and ready to 
accept independence? Would it be strong enough to maintain the unity of this vast 
country which never before had been assembled in a similar way? India’s moral 
authority, Mahatma Gandhi, had not seldom reminded his compatriots that Indians 
had to be mature to deserve freedom. Here he interestingly concurred with Hume, 
who much earlier than Gandhi had admonished his Indian friends. Gandhi never 
hesitated to call off civil resistance and mass non-cooperation when he had the im-
pression that the agitation was becoming violent and barbarian – thus unbeseeming 
of an independent people. According to comments by Gandhi during the last stance 
of the fight for independence, which was more of a struggle for unity or to secure as 
big a chunk as possible of British-India, India should be left to itself to fend for its 
future. Even at the cost of violent outbursts. This indicates that he thought India to 
be mature for independence. No matter what the Mahatma thought, the ruling INC 
under the leadership of Nehru after attaining independence had to consolidate what-
ever was left to them of British-India. Viewing the situation as an outsider, it would 
have been tempting at that instance to set up India as a ‘Hindu rashtra’ or the Hindu 
counterpart state to Pakistan, as Hindus constituted the vast majority of the Indian 
population. But astonishingly, this highly human reflex was not followed. 
Many see at least one reason in Hinduism itself. In this belief, ‘God’ or the 
Higher Being is nameless, formless and bare of personality or quality. The umpteen 
names given to the Gods and Goddesses nevertheless are merely labels given by 
imperfect human beings, who seek salvation and chose the deity befitting them best. 
The chosen deity doctrine (= ishta-devata) was at first attributed to dharma (as Hin-
duism is widely called in India) and their deities but was not logically confined 
therein. Thus a tolerant tenor was immanent in Hinduism. Furthermore, Hinduism is 
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basically not missionary in its outlook, has no institutional organisations such as the 
church for Christian denominations and thus had not had any political say. For the 
realisation of its philosophical and spiritual values, Hinduism does not require a 
state or a certain kind of state. All these ‘failures’ of Hinduism were conducive for 
the future success of the secular state in India.9 
Concerning democracy, the other basic element of the Indian State, the American 
sociologist, Seymour Martin Lipset, contends that Hinduism is a significant factor 
for the continued existence of democracy in India – in spite of a host of adverse 
indicators. Lipset mentions inter alia religion being a positive factor in this issue. It 
is not a pre-requisite of the Hindu fold of religions pre-dominantly prevailing in 
India, to interfere in or meddle with daily politics (contrary to other religions). Thus, 
the separation of state and religion functions comparatively well in India.10 Another 
influencing factor, according to Lipset, is India’s past as a British colony. In contra-
distinction to other colonial rulers, Great Britain always tended to involve indige-
nous people into local governments. As a result, countries earlier ruled by the Eng-
lish were not suddenly precipitated into a hitherto unknown self-governance and a 
new type of governance called ‘democracy’. These nations had had some amount of 
practice in the art of rallying for votes and shouldering responsibility. But these were 
obviously not all the ingredients of being able to preserve the Indian State. Nehru 
and Gandhi, the leading figures in the struggle for independence, as well as many 
other intellectual Indians, had studied in the United Kingdom. Dr. Babasaheb Am-
bedkar, the formidable leader of the untouchables, who was later to be called ‘Father 
of the Indian Constitution’, had acquired his law degree from the United States. 
These eminent figures led India to freedom. It must here be noted that Dr. Ambedkar 
cannot exactly be called a freedom fighter, as he was pre-occupied with his own 
struggle in favour of the untouchables. Neither was he member of the INC. He was a 
founder of three parties, of which just the Republican Party of India (RPI) has sur-
vived the stormy decades of India’s younger history. But it is possibly Nehru’s 
greatest merit that he through his studies and his upbringing was groomed towards 
the Westminster type of democracy with a strong Prime Minister determining the 
fate of government policies. He had also witnessed too many atrocities in the name 
of religion to opt for any other model than a secular state. Nehru was probably the 
ideal person to lead the government in this situation concerning INC’s core values 
such as democracy and secularism. He was – different than Mahatma Gandhi – not 
inclined towards any religion. Knowing religion to be a sensitive item in India, he 
always stressed that there should be amicable co-existence between religion and a 
                                                          
9  Smith 1963, p. 29; Dohrmann 2002, pp. 164-165. I am here not going into the intricacies 
of the term 'Hinduism' which is not exactly correct in respect of talking of a religion.  
10  Lipset quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 14 July 1999, “Politischer Königs-
weg”, p. N6; Smith 1963, p. 26: “Hinduism's concern with political institutions and the 
course of human history is thus a secondary concern at most.” 
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secular notion of the State.11 Nehru expected the new institutions of the Indian State, 
such as the Parliament, the Supreme Court, the democratic set-up of the State as well 
as the unbiased approach in terms of religion towards the citizen of India, would 
have an integrating effect on the nation. These now Indian-governed institutions 
were to be accompanied by modern technology, heavy industries, dams and power 
plants as the ‘new temples’ of India. According to Nehru all these were to be the 
institutions in which the modern Indian citizen would learn to become a democratic 
and secular member of India. The resulting impact of the desired learning effect was 
in Nehru’s eyes discernible as a preserving factor of the Indian State. 
The INC had also set out to bring about an egalitarian society as democracy can-
not be thought of without equality. The means were to be positive discrimination 
and abolishment of untouchability. Mahatma Gandhi and with him the INC had 
nevertheless always put down the claims of the leaders of the depressed classes, of 
which the foremost leader was Ambedkar, for separate electorates. The INC pre-
ferred reserved seats for the untouchables. It went so far that Gandhi went on an 
indefinite fast to counter Ambedkar’s move to wrest separate electorates from the 
English during the Second Round Table Conference in London in 1932. The result-
ing regulations on the status of communities in the forthcoming Constitution (Gov-
ernment of India Act, 1935), entitled the Communal Award, was announced in Au-
gust 1932. The difference between the separate electorate and the reserved seats 
system was important. In the reserved seats system, the candidate could only be an 
untouchable in a certain number of constituencies, but they were never in a majority 
in any one constituency. This meant that though only an untouchable could be 
elected, higher castes could project their own chosen untouchable candidate, for 
whom the local untouchables themselves would not have voted, and vote him in due 
to their majority in this particular constituency. On the contrary, in the separate 
electorates system only untouchables could cast their vote for untouchable candi-
dates. According to Christophe Jaffrelot, the latter system would have endowed 
untouchables with their own chosen representatives, 
thereby constituting themselves into a real political force, whereas the reserved seats 
left open the possibility of upper caste-dominated parties co-opting untouchables, 
                                                          
11  Nehru called himself an agnostic. Writes Nehru in his autobiography: “Hinduism's con-
cern with political institutions and the course of human history is thus a secondary con-
cern at the most. The spectacle of what is called religion, or at any rate organised religion, 
in India and elsewhere, has filled me with horror and I have frequently condemned it and 
wished to make a clean sweep of it. Almost always it seems to stand for blind belief and 
reaction, dogma and bigotry, superstition and exploitation, and the preservation of vested 
interests. And yet I knew well that there was something else in it, something which 
supplied a deep inner craving of human beings. How else could it have been the tremen-
dous power it has been and brought peace and comfort to innumerable tortured souls?” 
(An Autobiography, p. 374, Oxford University Press, New Delhi Reprint 1980). 
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handing out tickets during elections and electing them, even when this ran contrary to 
the wishes of local untouchables (Jaffrelot 2005: 54). 
However, separate electorates were not to be, as Ambedkar would not risk being the 
cause of Gandhi’s death or moreover the cause for Gandhi’s committing suicide for 
his political view. Yet, Ambedkar was the only Indian politician whom Gandhi con-
tested by resorting to a fast.12 In the then negotiated ‘Poona Pact’ – thus titled as 
Gandhi at this time was in Yeravda Jail in Poona – a system of reserved seats was 
introduced, in which 148 seats (instead of the 71 put forward in the Communal 
Award) were granted to untouchables in the Legislative Council. 
This recourse to history was taken to show that the tussle over the way an egali-
tarian society should be ushered in was fought much before India gained independ-
ence in this certainly painful experience for Ambedkar who for a long time remained 
in the wilderness concerning historical writing. 
This episode shows another of the preserving factors the INC was sporting: the 
ability to accommodate very diverse streams of thoughts in spite of severe rifts. Bar-
ring the Muslim League, (in pre-independence India) the INC for a long time was 
the only serious contender for government responsibility in the centre as well as in 
the states. In its long history it experienced many splits and rejoinders. The 1907-
1916 schism has already been mentioned. As late as 1945 one group within the INC, 
the Congress Socialist Party, felt compelled to leave the INC. This group was more 
inclined towards socialist ideals which could not be fulfilled by the mainstream and 
catch-all-approach of the INC. The INC, also called the ‘umbrella party’, in the very 
beginning even housed the right wing Hindu Mahasabha and bore the seed from 
which its fiercest opponent, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), would one day 
emerge. Supporters of the Hindu Mahasabha, the precursor of the right wing 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), were followers of the INC and even their 
presidents. Not surprisingly, the annual sessions of the Hindu Mahasabha were held 
at the same time and place as the INC. However, the Mahasahbites created a conser-
vative, if not communal, bastion within the INC, which eventually led to their sepa-
ration from the INC in 1928. One of the prominent Congress leaders, Shyama 
Prasad Mookerjee, who also was a member of the Hindu Mahasabha, later split from 
Nehru in protest against his lenient attitude towards Pakistan and founded the BJS (= 
Bharatiya Jan Sangh), which after 1980 became the BJP (Mehra/Khanna/Kueck 
2003: 77). 
The rather tolerant attitude of the INC in accommodating differentiating, if not 
contradicting political opinions, was reflected in the very first elected Union Gov-
ernment of 1950. It included not only people from outside the INC and other politi-
cal parties, but even members of opposition parties like the aforementioned Ambed-
kar of the RPI and Mookerjee of the BJS. This political magnanimity was of course 
                                                          
12  Jaffrelot 2005, p. 65: Gandhi ‘gambled’ on Ambedkar’s self-restraint precisely because he 
knew that he would not respond by resorting to violence. 
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nurtured by the fact that the INC had an overwhelming majority in the Indian Par-
liament, which is the Lok Sabha, and was unchallenged by any other party (Tha-
kurta/Raghuraman 2004: 136). The INC was so dominant in the Indian political 
landscape that it prompted the eminent scholar, Rajni Kothari, to describe the Indian 
party system 
as a system of one party dominance (which, it may be noted, is very different from 
what is generally known as a one party system). It is a competitive party system but 
one in which the competing parts play rather dissimilar roles. It consists of a party of 
consensus and parties of pressure. The latter function on the margin […]. Inside the 
margin are various factions within the party of consensus. Outside the margin are 
several opposition groups and parties, dissident groups from the ruling party […]. 
These groups outside the margin do not constitute alternatives to the ruling party.13 
If one looks at the elections results from 1952 to 1962, one can well imagine the 
near total dominance of the INC. 
Table 1:  Lok Sabha elections and popular votes and seats won by the INC  
Election 
year 
Seats 
(total) 
Seats won 
(absolute) 
Seats won 
(%) 
Popular 
vote (%) 
1952 489 364 74.4 45.0 
1957 494 371 75.1 47.8 
1962 494 361 73.1 44.7 
1967 520 283 54.4 40.8 
1971 518 352 68.0 43.7 
1977 542 154 28.4 34.5 
1980 529 353 66.7 42.7 
1984 542 415 76.6 48.1 
1989 529 197 37.2 39.5 
1991 534 227 42.5 36.5 
1996 543 140 25.8 28.8 
1998 539 141 26.2 25.9 
1999 543 114 21.0 28.3 
2004 545 145 26.6 26.2 
 
When Kothari was writing his article in 1964, the INC was for the third consecutive 
election enjoying a near three-quarter majority in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) 
whilst only having a yield in popular vote of below 50 per cent. The large discrep-
ancy in popular vote translating into many more seats can be explained through the 
Indian electoral system. Its first-past-the-post system allows the candidate to be 
elected who enjoys the support of the relative majority of voters. All the other votes 
are not counted. Therefore at the outset of India’s democratic history the INC for a 
                                                          
13  Rajni Kothari, “The Congress ‘System’ in India” (article dates from 1964), in: Zoya 
Hasan 2004, pp. 40-41. 
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long time benefited from the opposition votes being split due to infighting, thus al-
lowing the Congress candidate to emerge victorious. The ‘one party dominance’ of 
the INC certainly was beneficial in preserving the young State’s unity and integrity. 
There was no great fighting between the ruling ‘party of consensus’ (with its catch-
all attitude) and the marginalised opposition parties. Nehru and his government were 
therefore able to concentrate on ambitious projects such as modernising at least the 
Hindu society, especially concerning their marriage and succession laws. However, 
in this quest, Nehru had to overcome strong, conservative inner-party opposition led 
by the other Congress stalwart and Minister for Home Affairs, Vallabhbhai Patel. 
Patel’s death in 1950 eased Nehru’s work. Nehru was rather afraid of changing the 
Muslim status quo, lest they feel as a foreign people in a Hindu dominated State. 
Concerning INC’s task to preserve the Indian State, there were at the same time 
challenges from within and without. Just to name some, it may be recalled that the 
arch rivalry with Pakistan began with the first Kashmir conflict which led to the till 
today highly controversial accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union soon after the 
partition of British-India on 15 August 1947. Rulers of the Princely States, such as 
Kashmir, had been encouraged to accede to either Dominion – India or Pakistan, 
taking into account factors such as geographical contiguity and the wishes of their 
people. The Maharaja of Kashmir delayed his decision in an effort to remain inde-
pendent. But then an internal revolt precipitated events in Kashmir. The uproar 
against an oppressive taxation sparked off cross border movements between Kash-
mir and Pakistan. Being a Muslim majority state and contiguous to Pakistan, Kash-
mir was expected to accede to Pakistan; since the Hindu Ruler acceded instead to 
India, a dispute arose in the case of Kashmir.14 The outcome of the ensuing imbro-
glio is very well known. Recently politicians are again trying to mend this mishap of 
attaining independence, with General-turned-President Musharraf and the Indian 
Prime Minister attempting to at least arrive at confidence building measures, not to 
speak of solving the problem. 
On home turf, even intra-Indian borders, namely those of the former English 
Presidencies with their old administrative boundaries, had to be redrawn along lin-
guistic lines. But even these administrative measures had been foreshadowed by 
Gandhi’s recognition of Provincial Congress Committees (PCC) along linguistic 
lines, such as the Andhra PCC, Tamil Nadu PCC and the Karnataka PCC. The corre-
sponding areas had, until the revamping of the states had taken place, been part of 
the giant Madras Presidency. Another area to be revisited was the Bombay Presi-
dency. Reorganising of States brought the INC, in fact, under pressure of the parties 
and groups at the margin as Nehru and the INC would not concede subdivisions 
easily. It took one of the Andhra leaders to fast unto death and one militant regional 
party to threaten Nehru to dislodge the INC in today’s Maharashtra until statehood 
was granted. These grants were all preserving acts concerning the unity of India. 
                                                          
14  For more details: Jakob Rösel, “Die Entstehung des Kaschmirkonflikts”, in: Draguhn 
1999; Bazaz 1954, pp. 325-327. 
68 Jona Aravind Dohrmann 
 
Both Andhra Pradesh as well as Maharashtra have been strongholds of the INC. This 
is not particularly true anymore today. As the German historians Hermann Kulke 
and Dietmar Rothermund point out, in those days, ‘whenever the Congress came to 
terms with the federal plurality of India, it gained added strength rather than any 
loosening of its hold’ (Kulke/Rothermund 1999: 302). 
Soon after Nehru’s demise the decline of the INC began. Not quickly and not 
even immediately visible for the outsider. Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, inducted 
to the helm of affairs as a compromise candidate by the Congress High Command, 
could for some time keep up the image of an invincible INC as the party of consen-
sus. As can be seen from table 1, ever since the 1967 elections there has been steady 
downward movement in Congress’ fortunes with sporadic highs and lows, but with 
the downhill direction prevailing. Whereas in the early stages of post-independence 
the INC was commanding a thumping three-quarter majority, this has been reduced 
by and by to around one quarter, which mirrors its popular vote support. 
Today it is argued, that coalitions are inevitably to stay in India given its diver-
sity and the electoral system of voting. One may rightly ask why, in the early phase 
of India’s independence, there were such clear majorities for the Congress. One 
answer runs thus: 
Congress was inseparably linked with the independence struggle and consequently its 
candidates continued to win not only at the centre but also in the states. But once the 
aura of the independence struggle began to fade and new challenges and new 
aspirations began to surface, the people found other parties and leaders to voice their 
concerns and aspirations and in whom to repose their trust.15 
This contention finds support in the following chart which shows the popular votes 
for the INC and other national parties declining. This reveals that not only support 
for the INC was dwindling but for other national parties as well. 
Table 2:  Popular vote for the INC and national parties 
Election year 1971 1977 1991 1996 1998 1999 
Popular vote for INC 43.7 34.5 36.5 28.8 25.9 28.3 
Popular vote for 
national parties 77 85 81 69 68 67 
Source:  Zoya Hasan; E. Shridaran; R. Sudarshan, India’s Living Constitution, permanent 
black, New Delhi 2004, p. 144. 
The INC along with the other national parties started losing support, so much so that 
more and more powerful regional parties on the fringes became the king-makers in 
the centre. Whilst the INC was until recently opposed to coalitions in the centre they 
have even adapted to this fairly new feature of Indian party politics. It was not easy 
                                                          
15  Ravi P. Bhatia, “Consequences of Electoral Systems on Coalition Governments”, in: 
Singh/Mishra 2004, p. 269. 
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for the party who thinks itself as being the natural party of governance. Speeches of 
Sonia Gandhi illustrate that until as late as September 1998 the INC leadership 
thought – as though not having participated in the past 10 years of party politics – 
that 
this [the coalitional phase] is a passing phase and we will come back again with full 
force and on our steam. […] In the last few months, I get the feeling that the country, 
fed up with over two years of non-governance, is waiting to give us another chance.16 
Soon after, Vajpayee’s government fell due to the withdrawal of the support of one 
of its allies, the AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagam) and its 
leader Jayalalithaa. The INC also had its hand in this tactical move. But it miscalcu-
lated upon its own power status, as one of its regional leaders, the Congress strong-
man from Maharashtra, Sharad Pawar, together with like-minded politicians, broke 
away from the INC, forming the NCP (National Congress Party) because they had 
apprehensions about Sonia Gandhi’s foreign origin. Gandhi dramatically submitted 
her resignation from the post of party president. What followed was a high drama, 
Congress being at its best, of sycophancy and farcical shows of loyalty, resulting in 
Gandhi’s reinstatement as Congress President. 
Even this blow did not immediately prompt reconsiderations on the INC’s poli-
cies towards other parties. It took the now former ‘party of consensus’ another five 
years to realise openly, that coalition politics were to stay in India, not just as an 
aberration of Indian politics, but as one of its salient features – at least in the fore-
seeable future. In its Shimla conclave in June 2003 the INC finally came to terms 
with the ground realities of its electoral prospects, seeing their support shrinking in 
key states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. The INC now 
seemed to understand that their weakness in these populous states would not be tran-
sitory and that they would have to tie up with other parties, whom they had earlier 
just regarded as the ‘margin’, at best able to exert limited pressure. Unexpected by 
almost everyone, in May 2004 the tables turned again in favour of India’s grand old 
party. It was not a landslide victory though, as many Indians like to name it when an 
unforeseen change of government occurs. As can be seen from table 1, the INC, 
though losing in its popular vote share by another 2.1 per cent, still managed to raise 
its seat tally to 145 (as against 114 in the previous election of 1999). 
Despite the fact that the INC once again became the single largest party in the 
Lok Sabha, and having tied with several other smaller parties, this coalition, going 
by the name ‘United Progressive Alliance’, was not able to win a majority. It is de-
pendent on the ‘outside’ support of the two Communist Parties of India. Termed as 
fragile, this novelty – for INC-conditions – has completed its first year of govern-
ance. The electorate had by and large repudiated the ‘Shining India’-campaign of the 
NDA-government (National Democratic Alliance) which was also marred by com-
                                                          
16  Sonia Gandhi during the ‘brainstorming session’ of the INC in Pachmarhi in September 
1998 quoted in: Thakurta/Raghuraman 2004, p. 161. 
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munal outbursts and even state endorsed pogroms in Gujarat. Lastly, the issue of 
Sonia Gandhi’s foreign origin did not spark protest of the voters.17 As leader of the 
triumphing party she was destined to become India’s next Prime Minister. After the 
elections were won, the Congress Parliamentary Party elected her as their leader. 
But soon thereafter she sprang a surprise on friends and foes alike by renouncing her 
claim to be Prime Minister and recommending the senior Congress leader 
Dr. Manmohan Singh for this post. Whatever her ulterior motives may haven been, 
this was the wisest move she could contemplate as this took all the steam out of the 
campaign directed against her. 
Whatever is to be said of the INC, it has accepted the rules of democracy (except 
for the comparatively brief period of Emergency in the mid-1970s), thus adding 
another preserving factor to the Indian State. It has never – not even actually during 
the Emergency – tried to eliminate political competitors.18 It would probably have 
had ample opportunity to do so, completely ruling India in the centre as well as on 
the state level. But democratic culture, which for a long time had been the ‘um-
brella’-quality of the INC within its own fold, later was applied to the parties outside 
its setup. And these parties have reciprocated this mind-set. The democratic quarrel 
may not always have been executed in a cultured manner, but it was nevertheless 
democratic. Thus, till today Nehru’s ideas of fair play in politics and more particu-
larly in democracy are prevailing. How strong the other preserving factor concerning 
the Indian State still is, namely the Indian or Nehruvian concept of secularism, re-
mains to be seen. As the other parties also largely adhere to the democratic forms of 
opinion-formation, it cannot be seen as a big surprise – as some western commenta-
tors do – that political power in India passes from one hand into the other relatively 
smoothly. Charges of election fraud on a big scale are also seldom or never heard of 
in India. Despite all shortcomings the INC can be regarded as Preserver of the Indian 
State as under the rule of this party a viable democratic State was established with 
supporting salient features such as the secular outlook of the State. Furthermore, 
under Nehru’s and his successor’s leadership the INC managed to ward of external 
and internal challenges in order to preserve the State. Given the limited space of this 
article, these are merely some factors which may be seen as having had preserving 
tendencies concerning the Indian State/Union or the Unity of India. 
 
                                                          
17  See a very interesting write-up on this issue by Uwe Skoda, “Wahlverwandtschaften - Zur 
Verbindung von Politik und Verwandtschaft im indischen Wahlkampf”, in: Südasien-In-
formationen, Nr. 6, July 2004. 
18  This contention is ironically not true for the inner-party democracy of the INC, where it 
often willingly submitted itself to the dynastic rule by the Nehru-Gandhi clan ever since 
Indira Gandhi acquired unquestioned control over the party by splitting it in 1969. For 
further elaboration vide: Thakurta/Raguraman 2004, pp. 143-149. 
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5 Destroying India? 
Nevertheless, the INC cannot be spared concerning the discussion of more destruc-
tive attitudes taken up by the party. As was said before, the INC projected itself as 
the guardian of secular interests, thus maintaining one of the main pillars of the In-
dian State as promulgated by the Constitution. The secular heritage was derived 
from the period of the independence struggle. Still, political opponents often 
branded the INC ‘pseudo-secular’, which though being a tendentious allegation, is 
not altogether to be done away with. Often, when it seemed opportune, the INC 
resorted to ‘playing the Hindu Card’. This basically means that the INC was trying 
to avoid the impression that it was pampering Muslims and thereby abandoning the 
Hindu majority’s interests. Right from Nehru’s times onwards, secularism was not 
on the agenda of every Congressman. This prompted Nehru to remark in his autobi-
ography, that „many a Congressman was a communalist under his nationalist cloak.“ 
Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish pioneer of developmental policies, even saw com-
munalist roots in the INC in the frequent usage of Hinduistic symbols and idioms by 
Mahatma Gandhi.19 This perhaps explains why the Muslim League was estranged 
from very early on. 
Compromising the inner fabric of the Indian Union was quite often done when 
the INC felt its power being weaned away by other parties who were conquering the 
political space, which for a long time had been unquestionably occupied by the Con-
gress.20 The Gujarat riots, which cost the Muslim population of Gujarat dearly, are 
still fresh in memory. The Sangh Parivar, or group of right-wing organisations and 
parties, had sparked off a pogrom against the minority to avenge an ostensible as-
sault of Muslims on Hindu activists (kar sevaks) who were returning from Ayodhya 
in the now infamous town of Godhra, where 58 people died in a burning train car of 
the Sabarmati Express.21 In the aftermath of this tragedy, which hit the state just a 
year after the epic earthquake of 2001, the INC tried to regain power. But rather than 
confronting BJP’s aggressive Hindutva policies (promoting Hinduism as the way of 
life for Indian) head-on, the events in Gujarat revealed how devoid the INC was of 
having a coherent strategy in its attempts to counter the Sangh Parivar. The INC 
gambled on accepting one of the former BJP Chief Ministers, Shankersinh Vaghela, 
into their ranks, not as a mere party member but as the Gujarat Congress Chief. 
Vaghela had been a RSS activist for the better half of his political career, but had 
quit the BJP on grounds of factional infighting. First, he formed his own party 
                                                          
19  Myrdal 1968, p. 236, where he further elaborates that ‘despite it broadminded leaders and 
secularist resolutions, the Congress was basically Hindu in outlook.’ He contends that the 
more successful the INC became, the more it transformed into a Hindu party in the eyes 
of many Muslims, so that ‘it was thus Gandhi more than anyone else who helped trans-
form Jinnah from a keen Indian nationalist into the architect of Pakistan’. 
20  For more details see Dohrmann 2002, pp. 177-183. 
21  For details, see Zakaria 2002. 
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(Rashtriya Janata Party), but after it did not fare well in the elections it merged with 
the INC. 
The upcoming elections in December 2002 were widely seen as a battle between 
Narendra Modi’s sectarian Hindutva and secularism. Instead of castigating the state-
endorsed pogroms against Muslims, individuals and organisations close to Vaghela 
attacked the Modi government for not having done enough to completely eliminate 
cow slaughter in the state, while slaughtering human beings was anathema. Not un-
justly, the INC for utilising this strategy was seen as furthering a ‘soft Hindutva’, so 
as not to lose out on the successful campaigning of the BJP in the state. INC’s op-
portunism was so obvious that even Modi was able to cheer up the crowds attending 
his speeches by remarking, 
that the people of Gujarat were known for their willingness to pay a couple of Rupees 
more to buy ‘the real thing’ rather than settle for an imitation product. ‘Don’t buy 
copycat products’, he exhorted the crowds, drawing appreciative chuckles and 
applause (Thakurta/Raghuraman 2004: 170). 
The INC was punished with an annihilating election result. The BJP romped home 
with a staggering two-thirds majority. This too, in the home state of the Mahatma. 
Probably the devastating results for the INC did not occur on account of the, in fact, 
severely communally polarised society but due to the adoption of a faulty campaign 
strategy to woo the electorate of Gujarat. This may, to some extent, be verified by 
the Lok Sabha elections of 2004 when the INC managed to garner 12 of the 26 as-
sembly seats by returning to old values, thus reducing the gap between the BJP and 
itself. It may be remarked that the INC would probably make some headway if it 
adopted a clear-cut secular strategy, as BJP’s Gujarat unit is a seriously divided 
body. Recently some high-ranked politicians approached the BJP leadership in Delhi 
requesting the removal of its erstwhile crowd puller, Modi, as he is internally and 
more so internationally becoming a liability. So far to no avail. 
After presenting this more recent example of the INC’s failures (which of course 
had manifold precursors) the evergreen of reproaches against the INC must be men-
tioned: the internal Emergency from 1975 to 1977. This seems to be a blot on the so 
far clean vest of the INC concerning its democratic credentials. During this period, 
many Indians and India’s friends abroad started doubting whether India would sur-
vive as a democratic country or whether it would finally join the ranks of other post-
colonial societies as an authoritarian state. Even the renowned Professor for Political 
Science in California, Ram Mohan Roy, in 1975 stated that 
the era of a free-wheeling press, impassioned parliamentary debates and brilliant 
oratory by the opposition is over. It would be unrealistic to expect a willy-nilly return 
to the pre-Emergency openness and freedom.22 
                                                          
22  Ram Mohan Roy quoted in: Bipan Chandra 2003, p. 278. 
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What had happened to pass such harsh words on India’s democratic set-up? In the 
years 1974 to 1977 India went through fairly turbulent weather. From January 1974 
to June 1975 India experienced a series of agitations, called bandhs and gheraos 
(strikes and shutdowns). Preceding that Indira Gandhi asserted her authority within 
the INC, which she had deliberately split in 1969, and as well as in the Indian politi-
cal scene. In the 1971 elections, the INC swept the polls and wanted to regain its 
stand in the states where the party had faltered. The Bangladesh war and Indira Gan-
dhi’s election campaign to remove poverty with the telling slogan ‘garibi hatao’ 
(‘remove poverty’) enhanced her position in the Indian polity so much so that she 
and the Congress leadership felt it must acquire all the levers of power in the states, 
which were, after all, the agencies for implementing much of the needed reforms and 
developmental programmes and policies. The states’ legislative assembly election 
brought a huge victory to the INC. Indira Gandhi and the INC had now unified the 
political command in the centre and the states, giving Gandhi virtually complete 
control over the party, her cabinet and the chief ministers. This dominance was not 
even achieved by her father, Nehru, in his time. 
But dark shadows were already lingering across the political skies of the INC. 
India was hit by an energy crisis which made oil prices rise and sparked inflation. 
This in turn sent the cost of fertilisers to soaring heights and exacerbated the indus-
trial recession. This tendency could not be immediately reversed and was aggravated 
by a political crisis. General protests led by eminent leaders, still known from the 
independence struggle such as Jayaprakash Narayan (‘JP Movement’), made the 
political climate suffocating for Indira Gandhi. She could not curb these challenges 
in political discourse and resorted to imprisoning most opposition leaders. Then, 
Indira Gandhi’s immediate opponent in the general elections, Raj Narain, had filed 
an election petition against her, challenging the validity of her election on grounds 
of misappropriation of government funds and facilities during her election cam-
paign. She could only retain the prime ministerial post by resorting to coercing the 
President to declare a national emergency instead of admitting that this was her own 
personal emergency (Kulke/Rothermund 1999: 304). As Kulke and Rothermund go 
on, the Emergency threw up a mixed bag of results: 
The Emergency measures did lead to a certain improvement in the economic 
situation: no strikes were allowed, inflation was curbed and general discipline greatly 
improved. But all this was at the cost of the loss of civil liberties, which were, after 
all, the most cherished heritage of the Indian freedom movement (Kulke/Rothermund 
1999: 304). 
This view is supported by Chandra, who in the concluding chapter of his book on 
the Emergency, outlines in a rather balanced way the benefits and drawbacks re-
garding the Emergency. In the heated inner political situation Indira Gandhi was 
faced with the choice of total surrender or a fight to the end. She responded by re-
sorting to authoritarian rule, thereby morally betraying her liberal-democratic up-
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bringing and the ideals of the independence movement of which she was also part 
and parcel. 
The very goals the INC fought for zealously during the pre-independence era 
were compromised by Indira Gandhi and the INC callously. They tampered with 
governmental structures and weakened all government and civil institutions. Parlia-
ment and Cabinet were converted into nodding entities. Civil constitutional liberties, 
such as the freedoms of expression and association and the right of habeas corpus 
(the right to appeal to the courts against arbitrary arrest) were suspended. Her own 
party, the INC, suffered probably the most. It was just expected to be a disciplined 
organisation without any inner party democracy, riddled by splits and popular con-
tempt. The party far from being a cadre party was in an advanced state of decay, 
having become totally dysfunctional as power was concentrated in few hands. 
This beleaguering and sullen situation ended when Indira Gandhi suddenly at the 
end of 1976 announced that elections were to be held in early 1977. In these elec-
tions the opposition had learnt its lesson from former elections concerning the elec-
toral system and put up only one common candidate against the Congress candidate 
so as to avoid the splitting of votes in favour of the INC. Popular vote plummeted to 
an unprecedented 34.5 per cent and an even worse representation in the Lok Sabha 
of only 28.4 per cent of the seats. 
The INC in the end did not destroy the delicate fabric of Indian democracy but 
severely jeopardised India’s federal and liberal structures, bringing the country to 
the brink of ushering in an authoritarian state. As a by-product, one may say, the an-
nouncement of elections after the Emergency commenced Indian coalitional politics, 
bumpy as the initial stages might have been. The INC susceptibility towards a 
stronger Hindu slant in its policies also shows that there are other concepts of the 
Indian State prevailing in India. Not only the BJP and its right-wing parivar organi-
sations favour a State which adheres to ‘hindutva’ as the guiding line. These ideas 
are also well-known in Germany where some politicians from the conservative side 
declare that Christianity is the guiding culture (‘Leitkultur’) of the German State. A 
change in concept in India would have a strong impact on the Indian State. Whether 
it would be as viable as the prevailing one is difficult to answer. So far the INC has 
always returned to secular values so as to not to destroy the fragile fabric of Indian 
society and at the same time maintaining the integrity of the Indian State. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The aforementioned deliberations in which the allegory of the Trimurti is thrust 
upon the INC shall help in identifying the party’s contribution to the formation of 
the Indian State. It reveals that the INC as the champion of the fight for independ-
ence was not always complying with its own high ideals when it came to dealing 
with crisis and opposition in the political arena. One may ponder what might have 
happened if Mahatma had succeeded in persuading his party colleagues to dissolve 
the INC and transform it into a welfare society. The day before he was assassinated, 
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the Mahatma drew up a constitution for the INC that would enable the Congress to 
effectively complete the social revolution for which the independence of India had 
cleared the way and to guide the politics of the country instead of being reduced to 
the status of a mere party machine in the hands of the ruling group. He went on to 
tell the Congressmen, that 
though split into two, India having attained political independence […] the Congress 
in its present shape and form has outlived its use. India has still to attain social, moral 
and economic independence […] [The Congress] must be kept out of unhealthy 
competition with political parties […] and communal bodies.23 
With the best of intentions he wished the All India Congress Committee (AICC) to 
resolve to disband the existing INC and ‘flower’ into a Lok Sevak Sangh (People’s 
Welfare Organisation). Gandhi already in the ‘creational period’ of the INC prophe-
sied future weaknesses of the organisation which were subsequently to emerge. 
Nehru and the other leaders – as you would expect – were in no mood to pay atten-
tion to the Mahatma’s advice. As Jha wryly remarks, the Congress leadership put 
Gandhi’s proposal ‘quietly on the shelf’ (Jha 2004: 147) and changed its role from 
spearheading the national movement to that of a political party controlling all the 
levers of power. It is purely hypothetical to wonder about what might have happened 
to the Indian State without a strong INC at the centre. Looking at neighbouring Paki-
stan, India might have gone the same way had the then emerging parties not firmly 
established a stable democracy. Perhaps India would have drifted apart for want of 
strong leadership. A weak centre may not have been able to control disintegrating 
tendencies based on language or ethnicity. Little states may have tried to hold the 
centre captive by threatening it with secession, like the tail wagging the dog. How-
ever, wisdom gained through hindsight does not really help in shedding light on the 
issues; it only allows conjecturing developments. 
The INC has certainly played a leading role in the creation of the Indian Union 
as we know it today. Through its political grasp over the entire country, it in many 
ways managed to preserve the liberal-democratic set-up of the nation, so much so 
that the INC itself was not able to destroy it in the darkest hour of the INC rule – the 
Emergency. The eventual advent of the coalitional period initially saw the Congress 
off from the centre stage of power in Delhi. The last election held in 2004 has dem-
onstrated that the INC, in spite of its steep decline from the early decades of inde-
pendent India, should not be written off as a political force, but that it proves to be 
astonishingly resilient to wage new struggles in a much changed political arena. The 
INC has understood the pattern of the new coalitional era. The leadership of the 
INC, much as it still might be thinking the INC to be the ‘natural party of govern-
ance’, diligently mask their wishful thinking and so far play their role well in the 
coalition of the day. 
                                                          
23  Gandhi’s Last Will and Testament in: Jha 2004, p. 149. 
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The INC has heeded the advice of their British founder father that ‘nations by 
themselves are made’ and it is yet to be seen how it will further develop India, 
whether the government will really opt for the poor and thus fulfil Mahatma Gan-
dhi’s dream of attaining social, moral and economic independence. 
 
Are ye Serfs or are ye Freemen, 
Ye that grovel in the shade? 
In your own hands rest the issues! 
By themselves are nations made! 
(Sir Allan Octavian Hume, “Awake”)24 
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